Synopsis of Delueze/Bergson Film Theory

Cinema 1: The Movement-Image

Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project

Both Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson were, to extremely varying degrees, philosophers interested in cinema who used cinema to suit their particular intellectual needs. In the case of Bergson, he cultivated his ideas during a zeitgeist that included the invention of cinema (late 19th century). To a large extent, Bergson's philosophical ideas were shaped by the same cultural, economic, and technological climate that gave rise to narrative cinema. Deleuze on the other hand, erected a two-volume Bergsonian philosophy of cinema toward the end of the century that stands as one of the most stimulating studies of time and cinema. Although a self-professed Bergsonian, Deleuze's sprawling philosophical style is in stark contrast to Bergson's precise and systematic philosophical system. Deleuze's postmodern style is part of its appeal -playful, mercurial, and open to creative interpretation. Terms that are meant to carry critical weight are introduced offhandedly and then left hanging for pages. One neologism gives birth to three others. In a sense, Deleuze's style, forever Becoming, is more Bergsonian than Bergson.

I'll begin with a brief, synoptic overview of Deleuze's cinema project before moving on to a more detailed exposition. The broad sweep of Deleuze's two cinema books, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* , is to chart a fundamental shift from classical pre-WW2 cinema [movement-image] to post-WW2 cinema [time-image] (*Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* . Trans. Hugh Tomlinsom and Barbara Habberjam. 1983. London: The Athlone Press, 1986; *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* . trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. London: The Athlone Press, 1989). The former cinema, which finds its archetype in the Hollywood genre film, is dependent on movement and action. Characters in the movement-image are placed in narrative positions where they routinely perceive things, react, and take action in a direct fashion to the events around them. The movement-image is a form of spatialized cinema: time determined and measured by movement. In the time-image, which finds its archetype in the European modernist or art film, characters find themselves in situations where they are unable to act and react in a direct, immediate way, leading to what Deleuze calls a breakdown in the sensor-motor system. The image cut off from sensory-motor links becomes "a pure optical and aural image," and one that "comes into relation with a virtual image, a mental or mirror image" (Gilles Deleuze, "On the Movement-Image," trans. by Martin Joughin, *Negotiations: 1972-1990* (New York: Columbia University Press), 1995, 52).

In the time-image, rational or measurable temporal links between shots, the staple of the movement-image, gives way to "incommensurable," non-rational links. Because of these non-rational links between shots, vacant and disconnected spaces begin to appear ("any-space-whatevers"). As a consequence, the journey becomes a privileged narrative form, with characters in a more passive role, and themes centered on inner mental imagery, flights of fancy, and emotional and psychic breakdown. The result of this pure optical and sound image is, according to Deleuze, a direct image of time (a time-image or crystal-image).

The Shot and the "Set"

In the opening chapters of *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* Deleuze applies Bergsonian philosophy of time, change and movement to filmic construction. An important aspect of Bergsonian philosophy is that movement is distinct from space covered. Regardless of how much you divide space, movement will always occur in a concrete duration (indivisible time). 'Real movement' equals concrete duration. False movement occurs when you add abstract time to immobile sections. (In fact Bergson used the 'cinematographical process' as an example of false movement: immobile sections [individual still frames] plus abstract time [the projector].) Deleuze notes three Bergsonian aspects to movement and change: "1) sets or closed systems that are defined by discernible objects or distinct parts; 2) the movement of translation which is established between these objects and modifies their respective positions; 3) duration or the whole, a spiritual reality which constantly changes according to its own relations" (*Cinema 1* , 11). Movement is comprised of that which "happens between objects or parts...[and] that which expresses duration or the whole" (*Cinema 1* , 11). After the above exposition Deleuze writes, "Now we are equipped to understand the profound thesis of the first chapter of [Bergson's] *Matter and Memory* : 1) there are not only instantaneous images, that is, immobile sections of movement; 2) there are movement-images which are mobile sections of duration; 3) there are, finally, time-images, that is, duration-images, change-images...which are beyond movement itself...." (11).

Bergson's own solutions to Zeno's paradoxes will add clarity to the above exposition. In one of the paradoxes, Zeno offers the logical deduction that the tortoise, once with a lead, could never be surpassed by the much faster Achilles because each point along the way is infinitely divisible. Each advance Achilles makes is matched by the tortoise's, with the space remaining between them infinitely divisible, ad infinitum. Bergson claims that this remains a paradox only when the movement, the race, is treated like the space and is divided into an infinite series of movements rather than the single movement that it is. Bergson anticipates how Achilles might explain the paradox: Achilles would simply describe the race as taking one step followed by a second, a third, and so on until he surpasses the slower stepping tortoise. When both movements are treated as indivisible wholes the paradox is removed. (Bergson solves Zeno's paradox of the arrow in the same manner. You can not treat the object moving with the act of movement itself.) Applied to Deleuze's breakdown above, we see that each static point along the race is 1 (sets or closed system or immobile section); each point relating to each other becomes 2 ("movement of translation" or "movement-images" or a "mobile section of duration"); and the indivisible race in its whole is understood as 3 (duration or time-image).

Deleuze then applies this to cinema. At the first level is "frame, set or closed system." This includes all that occurs in the present image: sets, characters and props. "The closed system determined by the frame can be considered in relation to the data that it communicates to the spectators: it is 'informatic'..." (*Cinema 1* ,18). A sets informatics can vary from "empty" (black or white frame) to "full." The set is more specific than a shot because it can include sub-sets in the case of moving camera shots that reveal new information, or if changed internally: "...it determines an out-of-field, sometimes in the

form of a larger set which extends it, sometimes in the form of a whole into which it is integrated." At the second level is the shot and movement: "Movement expresses a change of the whole, an aspect of change, a duration or an articulation of duration" (*Cinema 1* ,18). "The shot is the movement-image. In so far as it relates movement to a whole which changes, it is the mobile section of a duration" (*Cinema 1* , 22).

At this point one may wonder what the difference is between Deleuze's set and the conventional term shot. Deleuze, influenced by Jean Mitry, defines shot as follows: "The word 'shot' can be reserved for fixed spatial determinations, slices of space or distances in relation to the camera" (*Cinema 1* , 25). Hence in Deleuze's terminology, the shot is subsumed by the set, creating more room for theoretical or analytical distinction. However, as with most Deleuzian neologisms, a vagueness clings to the term. For example, when exactly during a moving camera shot does one set become another? Or, how much new information is needed before one set changes to another? If not a precise term, it does add an important component to a psychological consideration of filmic time in the notion of changing 'informatics'. The idea of continually changing sets raises the question of the relationship between the amount and type of information processed in a shot and the sense of perceived temporality. How is temporality affected by the amount of narrative and/or visual information (less information/stronger sense of time)? With respect to how time is perceived or felt, is there a difference in terms of the type of information given: visual vs. aural, sound vs. dialogue, color vs. black & white? In other words, does the type (and rate) of information given have an affective difference on aspects of time (for example, aesthetic, or psychological time).

In the movement-image, dominant in pre-World War 2 cinema, time and the image are subordinate to movement in all its forms. The movement does not give us a holistic time but a "mobile section of duration" (what Bergson would refer to as spatialized time). The early fascination with pure movement, such that we find in the myths of early film spectatorship (i.e. audiences phenomenally moving for fear of being run over in The Train Arriving at the Station), in pre-cinema optical toys, modern painting (The Futurists), and in communication technology, carried over into various aesthetic cutting designs in D.W. Griffith (parallel montage), the post-Revolution Soviet cinema (dialectical montage), French Impressionism (quantitative-psychic montage), and German Expressionism (intensive-spiritual montage).

This movement-image has two aspects, "one of which is oriented toward sets (frame or closed system) and their parts, the other towards the whole and its changes..." (*Cinema 1* , 55). If with think again of Zeno's race, the first sense of movement is the changing state of the bodies in their varying positions. The second sense of movement is the relation of these varying positions to the whole race itself understood as a continuous movement from beginning to end. The movement-image fragments into three sub-forms, each dominated by a particular process: perception-image (the perceptual process), action-image (the narrative process), and affection-image (the expressive process). These three types, which open up to many other (less rigorous) sub-forms (limit-image, matter-images, reason-image, etc.) are found, to varying degrees, in all types of pre-WW2 classical cinema.

After Deleuze establishes his broad theoretical and terminological groundwork, a good two-thirds of the book is an at times fascinating, at times infuriating, impressionistic journey through (mainly) pre-WW 2 great "movement-image" auteurs (Griffith, Eisenstein, Gance, Grémillon, Vigo, Murnau, Lang, Renoir, Buñuel, Stroheim, Hawks, Bresson, Nicholas Ray, etc.). Deleuze's journey is structured around some fascinating dialectical comparative analyses that are founded on varying subtleties within the impregnated movement-image. The best of these being Bresson vs. Dreyer within the context of affection-image (i.e. the close-up); Chaplin vs. Keaton under the action-image; and Kurosawa vs. Mizoguchi in a discussion of physical and metaphysical space.

Any-Space-Whatevers

Connected to the concept of sets is that of the "any-space-whatevers." Here we have another example of Deleuze appropriating an existing term and transforming it into something entirely his own. Deleuze borrows the term from the French anthropologist Pascal Augé. Augé uses the term to help understand the effects of modern urban planning on the human psyche and interpersonal relations:

"An 'any space whatsoever' is a space such as a metro stop, a doctor's waiting room, or an airport terminal. It is an anonymous space people pass through, ... a point of transit between places of 'importance', such as the metro, which is merely the space one passes through between home and work. Moreover, in such spaces -and this is what interested the anthropologist Augé- individuals become depersonalized....It is for this reason that Augé argued that the 'any space whatsoever'is a homogenous, de-singularizing space" (Jeffrey Bell, "Thinking with Cinema: Deleuze and Film Theory," *Film-Philosophy Electronic Salon* , available at www.mailbase.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy/files/paper.bell.html. Online. Accessed 24 September, 1997.).

In the above referenced essay, Jeffrey Bell summarizes author Reda Bensmaia's analysis of Deleuze's transformation of Augé's term. Bensmaia argues that Deleuze uses the term as a form of 'conceptual persona', in the way "...philosophers, artists, and scientists each...attempt to establish a sense of order to a fundamentally chaotic and forever changing world....In contrast to Augé, therefore, rather than being an homogenizing and de-singularizing force, Bensmaia shows that for Deleuze the 'any space whatever' is a condition for the emergence of uniqueness and singularities". Deleuze does touch on elements of Augé's initial usage, such as the train stations in Bresson's *Pickpocket* , the airport in Marker's *La Jetée* , the empty urban spaces in Antonioni, but then goes on to discuss it in a far more generalized sense:

"Any-space-whatever is not an abstract universal, in all times, in all places. It is a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own parts, so that the linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways. It is a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible"(*Cinema 1* , 109).

Deleuze goes on to discuss any-space-whatever as it is shaped by some primary aspects of mise-en-scène: color, light, dark, white, black, shadows. It becomes an index of personal style and sensibility ('conceptual persona'), evidenced for example by his comparison of Sternberg (aesthetic and passional), Dreyer (ethical), and Bresson (religious). Deleuze's claim with space is much the same claim as Andrei Tarkovsky's, that each director has their own aesthetic and personal sense of time.

Theory Into Practice

The first instance in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* of Deleuze applying theory to praxis comes with a discussion of the famous apartment dolly shot in *Frenzy* (1972). The conclusions are interesting, but the description is fraught with terrible inaccuracies. Deleuze describes the shot as such, "...the camera follows a man and a woman who climb a staircase and arrive at a door that the man opens; then the camera leaves them, and draws back in a single shot. It runs along the external wall of the apartment, comes back to the staircase that it descends backwards, coming out on to the pavement, and rises up the exterior up to the opaque window of the apartment seen from outside." Before noting the descriptive errors, here are Deleuze's observations based on his critical-philosophical terms. The gist of his analysis is that, as the camera moves the set changes ("movement in transition"), but this change is perceived as such only in relation to the whole (duration), which is the murder of a woman:

"This movement, which modifies the relative position of immobile sets, is only necessary if it expresses something in the course of happenings, a change in the whole which is itself transmitted through these modifications: the woman is being murdered.... What counts in these examples is that the shot, of whatever kind, has as it were two poles: in relation to the sets in space where it introduces relative modifications between elements or sub-sets; in relation to a whole whose absolute change in duration it expresses" (*Cinema 1* , 18).

Deleuze's descriptive errors do not effect the overall theoretical (general) point, but unfortunately render a wholly different meaning to the scene. To begin with, the camera does not "follow" but leads them up the stairs with a dolly back movement. It does not "draw back in a single shot" but in two shots linked with a classic Hitchcockian hidden cut. When the camera dollies back out of the door leading to the pavement, a man carrying a sack of potatoes walks horizontally (right to left) in front of the camera and Hitchcock cuts on the sack of potatoes filling the frame. The most fatal descriptive error comes at the end, with the claim that the shot "rises up to the exterior up to the opaque window of the apartment...." In fact the camera dollies straight back across the street cutting through the busy horizontal street traffic to stop at the opposite pavement framing the entire apartment building and portions of the adjoining buildings. The point of the shot is to move from the very quiet, specific, singular murder (the killer's apartment) to the noisy, general everyday (the whole apartment complex, street, adjoining buildings, people, etc.). It's a perfect, succinct summation of the classic Hitchcockian theme of the horror in the everyday. Deleuze's description infers that the camera brings us back to the specific, the killer's window, which destroys the meaning of the shot!

Another problem with Deleuze's description is the use of non-technical camera terminology (the camera, "follows" "runs" "comes back" "descends" "rises") that does not render the feel and sensibility of the movements (which in many cases is extremely vital to understanding what the camera is attempting to "say"). The already difficult task of visualizing camera movement through the written word is best achieved using proper, accurate terminology (dolly, track, pan, crane, zoom, etc.).

Disregarding the above criticism, Deleuze's *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* can be fruitfully applied to film studies in a variety of productive ways. For example, one can use these Deleuzian terms to base an interesting case study on the different ways in which the long take is used in popular cinema and art cinema. I'll provide an example by comparing the above shot from *Frenzy* to the penultimate shot in Michelangelo Antonioni's *The Passenger* (1975). The two long takes are similar in several respects. In both cases the set changes dramatically from an inside to an outside space, while a murder occurs off screen. The Antonioni shot is much longer: 6.15 compared to 1.17. (As noted earlier, the Hitchcock long take contains a hidden cut at 57 seconds, but since its purpose is to render the illusion of continuity we can consider it as one shot of 1.17).

The purpose of the long take in *Frenzy* is to heighten drama and suspense through contrast and irony. With the killer uttering the words, "...you're my type of woman" the woman's fate is sealed. The camera pans right slowly along the exterior wall, negotiates a circular pan over the staircase and begins to dolly back down the steps, retracing their walk. Along the corridor we see a small table and hanging coat on the right and red carpet on the floor. As the camera nears closer to the front door the still silence gives way to increasing street noise. The camera continues past the door (the hidden cut noted above occurs here), the sidewalk, into busy midday street traffic (cars, people, fruit carts cutting the frame horizontally) and stops across the street to face the building block in full view. The suspense is not in whether the woman will die -that is certain- but in not seeing how. By leaving the murder to the audience's imagination, Hitchcock is contrasting the representation of this murder to the Grand Guignol nature of the film's first murder. The relation of the sets to the whole is altered, but differently than we'll see in *The Passenger* . In this case the changed whole is complete, closed and resolved. The function of the long take is to shade and color the murder. The murder, as we'll see, is inconsequential in *The Passenger* . What adds to the richness of Hitchcock's long take is how it registers the film's theme. The camera's trajectory from the killer's quiet, personal inside space to the noisy, communal, indifferent outside space reflects the theme of the horror hiding within the mundane, everyday, just as the serial killer hides behind the façade of petite-bourgeois respectability.

In this thematic reading, the long take is still linked directly to the murder, whereas in *The Passenger* the long take in itself carries a meaning beyond the murder. *The Passenger* stars Jack Nicholson as David Locke, a discontent reporter/documentary filmmaker who goes to Africa on a job mission. He comes across a dead man in an adjoining hotel room and inexplicably decides to change identities with him. The corpse is of David Robertson, a British man heavily involved in illegal arms trading with a radical political organization. Armed with the dead man's diary, plane ticket, passport,

and other personal belongings, Locke begins to assume his identity, literally trying to transcend his life by living another. In the famous penultimate long take, Locke decides to respect Robertson's dangerous appointment with two shady men and waits stoically in a small Spanish village hotel.

To achieve the physically staggering effect of the camera movement Antonioni had a special gyroscopic crane built, named after its Canadian inventor, Wesscom, and took 11 days to film the shot. The shot's framing begins with Locke, cut off at the waist, lying on the bed and in the middle background a large iron gate window looking out onto a sun-bleached village courtyard. Locke turns onto his side. The camera begins to slowly dolly forward toward the window, leaving Locke's body below off-frame. On and offscreen sounds emanating from the courtyard are heard: voices, a car, a train. A white Peugot appears in the courtyard. Two men in suits exit the car. Children are seen throwing rocks (all figures are in long extreme long shot). The camera remains static, the window acting as a frame-within-a-frame. One of the men exits screen right. We hear the sound of a door being opened and closed, followed by footsteps. The camera reframes slightly to the right. The second man enters the frame and looks into the room/camera for a signal from the other man, and then turns to walk away. The camera restarts its forward movement toward the window. We hear a door open and shut again as the white car enters the frame and exits right. The camera has now tracked as close as physically possible to the prison-like iron gates of the window. Somehow the camera magically continues its forward movement, the iron gates disappearing from view. A police car enters the shot. The camera is now outside the room and slowly begins to pan around the courtyard, capturing the busy actions of the police and newly established central characters (Locke's wife and girlfriend). The pan has now completed a 360-degree arch of the courtyard and is facing the window. Inside the room we see Locke's wife and his girlfriend. The camera zooms in slightly and cranes to the right past an outside wall and a police officer to a second window that gives us a clear view of Locke's body lying on the bed. The camera cranes right up to the iron gates of the window for a final view of the characters inside the room briefly discussing Locke's death.

This long take, like the one in *Frenzy* , has no clear motivation or point of view. The implicit theme of *The Passenger* is one character's search for identity or self-hood through some form of transcendence. Many interpretations, from the secular to the profane, have been given to this outstanding shot (room/window-as-body and camera-as-soul, or camera movement as the conclusion of Locke's secular pilgrimage); but the camera's spectacular "escape" from the room is itself a symbol of this transcendence. We know that Locke is dead, but do not know with certainty what his death means. Unlike *Frenzy* , the conclusion of the movement and the whole does not provide closure.

Deleuze's appropriated term, any-space-whatever, can also be applied to the above discussion. For example, in reference to any-space-whatever Jeffrey Bell states that, "...Chris Marker uses airport terminals, public buildings, etc., as a means of undermining certain presuppositions one might have regarding the identity of character, plot, etc. Antonioni's use of desert landscapes does much the same thing; in short, the 'any space whatsoever' functions in much the same manner that the time-image does: it places the

identity of character, plot, etc., into crisis." In Frenzy we may not see the murder committed but we are certain of its occurrence, as we are of the killer. The murder advances the plot and adds to the loathsomeness of the serial killer (and by extension the audiences emotional relationship to him). In *The Passenger* the long take, while much longer, is full of new information, but none of it adding to the crisis in character identity. The camera movement itself stands for the character's final transcendence -he is killed as another person, David Robertson- but the shot gives us no insight into why David Locke felt this urge to transcend.

The Weakening of the Movement-Image

According to Deleuze, there were numerous intertwining social, economic, political and cultural factors behind the weakening of the movement-image and the appearance of the time-image, the cumulative effect of which took full effect only after the Second World War. For example, the weakening of the American Dream (a potent source of inspiration for some of the greatest action-image genres, The American Comedy, the Musical, and the Western), the raised consciousness of minorities, and the influence of new narrative literary modes on the cinema (stream of consciousness, the Nouveau Roman). For Deleuze, as it does in a parallel fashion for André Bazin, Italian neo-realism signaled this new beginning. Deleuze describes five characteristics of the new time-image, which found their first expression in neo-realism: "...the dispersive situation, the deliberately weak links, the voyage form, the consciousness of clichés, [and] the condemnation of the plot" (*Cinema 1* , 210). Deleuze continues, "In the city which is being demolished or rebuilt, neo-realism makes any-space-whatevers proliferate -urban cancer, undifferentiated fabrics, pieces of waste ground- which are opposed to the determined spaces of the old realism" (212).

This familiarity to Bazin has led some readers to interpret Deleuze's breakdown in strict historical terms and see a similar teleological drive in Deleuze, with the time-image replacing Bazin's realism. Though one can not deny a divisional breakdown, this would be incorrect since snippets of time-image can be found in pre-WW2 cinema (*Citizen Kane* for example), while the action-image still persists in postwar cinema: "...the greatest commercial successes always take that route [action-image], but the soul of the cinema no longer does" (*Cinema 1* , 206).

Cinema 2: The Time-Image

Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project

In his second book Deleuze tackles temporality in a more direct fashion. Although the book is considerably longer than the first (344 to 250 pages), Deleuze does not propose rigid or neat classifications. The central shift remains from a cinema that defined itself primarily through motion to one that concerned itself more directly with time. The time-image moved beyond motion by freeing itself of the "sensory-motor" link to a "pure optical and sound" (tactile) image. This emancipating of the senses concurred with a "direct relation with time and thought" (*Cinema 2* , 17). Deleuze spends considerable space discussing memory, especially Henri Bergson's views on memory, because it forms

an important part of the second book's central concept: crystal-image (or time-image). In fact, one gets the sense that Deleuze's two books align themselves with the Bergson book that most influenced Deleuze, *Matter and Memory* : movement-image (matter) and time-image (memory).

The Crystal-Image

Just as Bergson never gives us a finite definition of duration, Deleuze does not offer a singular definition of the time-image, or give a clear indication of what he means by a "direct image of time." We can, however, offer the following description based on Deleuze's many suggestive morsels, partial insights, and descriptive metaphors. The crystal-image, which forms the cornerstone of Deleuze's time-image, is a shot that fuses the pastness of the recorded event with the presentness of its viewing. The crystal-image is the indivisible unity of the virtual image and the actual image. The virtual image is subjective, in the past, and recollected. The virtual image as "pure recollection" exists outside of consciousness, in time. It is always somewhere in the temporal past, but still alive and ready to be "recalled" by an actual image. The actual image is objective, in the present, and perceived. The crystal-image always lives at the limit of an indiscernible actual and virtual image.

With the crystal-image, Deleuze assigns a form of temporality that accounts for the "present/pastness" of the film image. The crystal-image shapes time as a constant two-way mirror that splits the present into two heterogeneous directions, "one of which is launched towards the future while the other falls into the past. Time consists of this split, and it is ... time, that we see in the crystal" (*Cinema 2* , 81). David N. Rodowick sums up the time-image as one that fluctuates between actual and virtual, that records or deals with memory, confuses mental and physical time, actual and virtual, and is sometimes marked by incommensurable spatial and temporal links between shots (*Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* . Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997, 79-118).

The Crystal-Image and Bergsonian Memory

Bergson distinguished between two types of memory, habit formed memory and pure recollection (habitual memory and pure memory). The former is stored in the brain (matter), the service-house of action, and the latter within consciousness. (Bergson is vague on where, if not in the brain, pure memory is stored.) Bergson believes that nothing is forgotten. Pure memories live on forever. What happens is that the brain, with the aid of perception, censors the memories and selects the one's that are most necessary for immediate action. Habit memory dominates because it has more pragmatic value. Pure memory, like the fundamental self, is less called for and resurfaces during moments of disinterestedness (dreaming for example), or on the rare moments when it can serve as a helpful guide to immediate perception (and becomes a recollected image). For example, when we drive a car the brain summons the habitualized ability to drive that we have memorized through repeated practice. The brain does not recall the "unrepeatable" individual instances of each driving lesson, complete with the unique memory of what occurred on each occasion.

However, pure perception and pure memory exist only in theory because perception is always effected by memory, and pure memory is dependent on the brain for materialization. According to David Gross there is an intriguing third type of memory that Bergson hinted at but did not expand upon. In the essay "Bergson, Proust, and the Revaluation of Memory," David Gross describes this third memory as "unsolicited" independent memories that are disengaged from immediate action or perception ("Bergson, Proust, and the Revaluation of Memory," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 25 no. 4 (1985): 369-380). A person dominated by these unsolicited recollections would be overwhelmed by the flood of images and hindered in their ability to cope with reality. Gross feels that Marcel Proust appropriated this third type of memory as "involuntary memory" for his mega-novel *Remembrance of Things Past* . For some reason, perhaps because it did not serve any practical or immediate application, Bergson did not develop this third type of memory any further. It does, however, have interesting possibilities for cinema. For example, involuntary memory is a key textual device in three of Tarkovsky's films: *Solaris* , *Mirror* , and, most prominently, in *Nostalghia* .

Bergson's third type of memory also has an interesting parallel to Deleuze's discussion of memory and the time-image. According to Deleuze the proper equivalent for the time-image is not habitual or pure memory, but rather "the disturbances of memory and the failures of recognition" (*Cinema 2* , 55). Deleuze notes that from the start European cinema was more interested in failed forms of recognition: amnesia, hypnosis, hallucinations, madness, visions of dying, nightmares, and dreams (surrealism, dadaism, futurism, constructivism, psychoanalysis). The American action-image stood in contrast to the European search for this fragmentary vision: "European cinema saw in this a means of breaking with the 'American' limitations of the action-image, and also of reaching a mystery of time, of uniting image, thought and camera in a single 'automatic subjectivity', in contrast to the over-objective conception of the Americans" (55).

Deleuze's polarity of action-image/American and time-image/European is not that clear cut (as the centrality to the time-image of Ophüls and Welles testifies). However, if one considers Bergson's involuntary memory as the equivalent of Deleuze's "disturbances of memory and the failures of recognition," then habitual memory and pure recollection can be seen as paralleling realist, movement-image and the involuntary memory paralleling modernist and art film. In any sense, the importance Deleuze places on memory has obvious links to films that explore memory and consciousness through formal and thematic experimentation (Resnais, Welles, Tarkovsky, Sokurov, Ophuls, late Godard, and Hou Hsaio-hsien).

The "Non-Rational" Cut in the Time-Image

The incommensurable link between shots, which Deleuze calls the non-rational or irrational cut, signals an important difference between classical (movement-image) and modern (time-image) cinema:

"The so-called classical cinema works above all through linkage of images, and subordinates cuts to this linkage. On the mathematical analogy, the cuts which divide up two series of images are rational, in the sense that they constitute either the final image of the first series, or the first image of the second....rational cuts always determine commensurable relations between series of images and thereby constitute the whole rhythmic system and harmony of classical cinema....Time here is, therefore, essentially the object of an indirect representation, according to the commensurable relations and rational cuts which organize the sequence or linkage of movement-images....modern cinema can communicate with the old, and the distinction between the two can be very relative. However, it will be defined ideally by a reversal where the image is unlinked and the cut begins to have an importance in itself. The cut, or interstice, between two series of images no longer forms part of either of the two series: it is the equivalent of an irrational cut, which determines the non-commensurable relations between images" (*Cinema 2* , 213).

In the book *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine* , author D.W. Rodowick contrasts a scene from Keaton's *Sherlock Jr* . (1924) with a scene from Chris Marker's *Le jetée* to describe this vital difference between the movement-image and the time-image. In the *Sherlock Jr* . example Keaton moves from shot to shot across varying, illogical and precarious spaces: a garden, a busy street, a cliff side, a jungle with lions, train tracks in a desert, an ocean, a snowbank. Though these are nonsensical spaces, they are joined together in a rational order through match cuts and continuous screen direction. The effect is that time is subordinated to movement: "Time is measured only dynamically, as a process of action and reaction rebounding across contiguous spaces through match-cutting" (Rodowick, 3). Another more common example of this form of rational cutting across dislocated spaces can be seen in *La Verité* (1960, Henri-Georges Clouzet). In the sequence in question a romantic courtship between rebellious Dominique (Brigitte Bardot) and a conservative music student Gilbert (Sami Frey) is compressed through a series of shots linked by straight cuts. The sequence of short shots, which feature either both characters or one of them, cut from Dominique's flat, to a café, to a phone booth, to a cinema theatre, to outside Dominique's flat, and back inside her flat. Though the interval between shots is vague, the spatial and temporal uncertainty is rationally linked by the idea of romance and courtship.

Rodowick contrasts the Keaton example to a scene from *La jetée* , an odd choice given that *La jetée* is structured out of a series of (mainly) static photographs that are themselves "frozen in time." I will offer an example from Hou Hsaio-hsien's *The Puppet Master* (1993). The scene, which occurs approximately 90 minutes into the film, begins with a high angle shot looking down on a dirt road winding along a forest area. A couple we assume to be the central character Li Tienlu and his wife, walk along the road toward the camera, getting as close as long shot range before the image fades to black. The next shot is an extreme long shot of a suspended bridge amidst gorgeous forest foliage. Barely visible are two or three people walking across the bridge right to left, followed by a marching band. It is impossible to ascertain with certainty the physical or temporal link between these shots.

In summary, the classic movement-image is based on a rational ordering system (the continuity system) that is intended to make the story as legible and smooth running as possible. Even the terms of the continuity system, the match cut, the cut on action or movement, the 180-degree line, the reaction shot, the eye-line match, etc., are variations on movement. None of these terms relate directly to time (though time is implied). This is the basis of Deleuze's "rational" cut.

The Crystal-Image and Style

Deleuze uses the crystal-image as an aesthetic rather than purely theoretical tool by ascribing stylistic qualities to it. [Even though, as D.N. Rodowick reminds us, "there are few 'pure' examples of films where direct images of time predominate," 89.) Deleuze does this by ascribing different philosophical and psychological aspects of memories or crystal-images across filmmakers and genres. He compares, for example, the "perfect crystals" of Max Ophüls to Renoir's "cracked crystal"(*Cinema 2* , 85). Or, more generally, by the contrasting polarity of movement-image/American popular film and time-image/European modernist film. This demonstrates how Deleuze is as interested in questions of film style as in philosophy.

With regards film style, one would imagine the long take as a privileged style of the time-image, but this is not the case. Deleuze does not subscribe, as does Tarkovsky, to the notion that the long take, or time registered in the shot, is of a different value or type than time registered through montage. To Deleuze, this is a superficial distinction because, "the force or pressure of time goes outside the limits of the shot, and montage itself works and lives in time" (*Cinema 2* , 42). Hence time-image is not necessarily a cinema governed by long takes -though it can be- but a broader, philosophical separation from movement-image. However, much of what Deleuze says about depth-of-field in the crystal-image relates explicitly to the long take. In one of the book's finest moments, chapter 5: "Peaks of present and sheets of past: fourth commentary on Bergson," Deleuze gives an illuminating discussion of depth-of-field starting from Bazin's realist theory and demonstrated through Orson Welles:

"We suggest that depth of field has many functions, and that they all come together in a direct time-image. The special quality of depth of field would be to reverse time's subordination to movement and show time for itself. We are not saying that depth of field has the exclusive rights to the time-image....Our point is that depth of field creates a certain type of direct time-image that can be defined by memory, virtual regions of past, the aspects of each region. This would be less a function of reality than a function of remembering, of temporalization: not exactly a recollection but 'an invitation to recollect...'" (*Cinema 2* , 109).

At this point Deleuze introduces an interesting idea to the discussion of depth of field that equally informs a discussion of the long take. Deleuze feels that in most cases where depth of field is necessary, there is a connection to memory. He again explicates this through Welles. The memory link is not necessarily literal, as in a flashback, or through psychological imagery. It is an attempt to evoke a memory out of an actual present or "of

the exploration of a sheet of past from which these recollection-images will later arise" (109). With the poetic (and very Bergsonian) term "sheet of past" we can visualize a space where both actual and virtual image co-exist. As examples, he notes the high-angle shot in *Citizen Kane* "on an alcoholic Susan lost in the big room at the club in such a way as to force her to evoke"; and the opening low angle shot from *The Trial* that marks "the hero's efforts as he searches at all costs for what the law is charging him with" (*Cinema 2* , 109-110). Deleuze -as he always does with terms- expands "sheet of past" to include characters, so that each character can also represent or carry their own sheet of past which may overlap with those of others. So that *The Lady from Shanghai* tells the story of a "hero caught in the past of others, captured, snapped up....We have three characters in turmoil, like three sheets of past who come to submerge the hero...(*Cinema 2* , 113).

In *Citizen Kane* depth of field and the sequence shot is often used as a space in which the viewer can explore "virtual zones of the past" and choose memory elements to recall from the actual image (this can very clearly be related to Bazin's conception of a "democratic" mise-en-scène). In the Deleuzian sense depth of field is understood as a "function of remembering" and as a "figure of temporalization" [that] ....gives rise to all kinds of adventures in memory, which are not so much psychological accidents as misadventures of time..."(*Cinema 2* , 110). It is also in this sense that Deleuze contests the idea that all films are set in the present. Deleuze goes to great length to disprove this notion: "The tracking shots of Resnais and Visconti, and Welles's depth of field, carry out a temporalization of the image or form a direct time-image, which realizes the principle: the cinematographic image is in the present only in bad films" (*Cinema 2* , 39). This is central to the idea of Deleuze's time-image. As Jacques Aumont states:

"...the cinematic apparatus implies not only the passage of time, a chronology into which we would slip as if into a perpetual present, but also a complex, stratified time in which we move through different levels simultaneously, present, past(s), future(s) -and not only because we use our memory and expectations, but also because, when it emphasises the time in which things take place, their duration, cinema almost allows us to perceive time" (*The Image* , 129-130).

A Cinema of the Brain

Deleuze spends considerable parts of chapters 7 ("Thought and cinema") and 8 ("Cinema, body and brain, thought") discussing editing in relation to its role within classical and modern cinema, and to the idea of an intellectual cinema. Deleuze begins the discussion with the following interesting observation, "...from the outset, Christianity and revolution, the Christian faith and revolutionary faith, were the two poles which attracted the art of the masses" (*Cinema 2* , 171). Deleuze does not mean this to be a restrictive duality, since he notes remarkable differences within each group; for example, Rossellini, Bresson, and Ford within the Christians (I would add Dreyer, Tarkovsky, Lars von Trier, Rohmer, Schrader) and Rocha, Güney and Eisenstein within the revolutionaries (I would add Godard, Jançso, Dovzhenko). At this point in the chapter Deleuze is discussing these directors in relation to thought and belief, and ascribes to modern cinema the function of restoring our (lost) belief in the world. "Whether we are Christians or atheists...we need

reasons to believe in this world (*Cinema 2* , 172). Deleuze will discuss intellectual cinema only in the following chapter, but I noticed a commonality in the above names: with the possible exception of John Ford, the film's of the above directors have been called (or could be) at one time or another, intellectual. (Ford would surely hate for his films to be even considered as being intellectual!) Given the great differences between them, it raises the question, what is an intellectual film? At this point the question is partly rhetorical, since there may not be an "answer" (or at least an easy one). However, it is tangentially related to the question of stylistic sensibility, and informs Deleuze's next chapter.

The discussion of thought gives way in chapter 8 to a discussion of rational/irrational cutting and intellectual cinema. The use of rational/irrational here seems odd because it is used to define a cinema that includes a host of "intellectual" filmmakers. Only paragraphs before this statement Deleuze uses Resnais and Kubrick to argue for a new form of intellectual cinema (a "cinema of the brain"). Montage is assigned the function of restoring the "laws of the process of thought," but thought does not necessarily align with the rational or irrational. Linking the irrational cut and the non-commensurable to the time-image does, however, make sense in relation to the earlier noted "disturbances of memory and the failures of recognition" (hypnosis, hallucinations, madness, nightmares, etc.) and the break from a "sensory-motor" link (emancipated senses). What these all have in common, though they at times may appear contradictory, is a flux-like sense of "letting go" which can be linked to creative expression.

What also seems to be bubbling below the surface of Deleuze's rational/irrational duality is a parallel to Bergson's epistemological duality of the intellect and intuition. In Bergson's philosophy the intellect is connected to matter and spatialized time and intuition is connected to life and duration. The intellect, by nature, is a spatializing mechanism. To acquire knowledge it employs concepts, symbols, abstraction, analysis, and fragmentation. The intellect gives us a fragmented but necessary, pragmatic grasp of reality, whereas intuition is the means with which to grasp the essential element of reality: duration. Since it is the time-image that is able to give us fleeting moments of time (duration and "reality"), and the movement-image only an indirect representation of time, we can see a clear parallel between Bergson and Deleuze's dualism: intellect = rational, intuition = irrational.

Conclusion

Deleuze's two books are very much works of philosophy, but they are also, to an almost equal degree, concerned with film style. While his two cinema books argue for the practice of philosophy and concept building through cinema, the particular and varied philosophical sensibilities he discusses across his panoply of directors relate in the deepest sense possible to style. Deleuze feels that there is a "cinema of philosophy, a cinema of thought, which is totally new in the history of cinema and totally alive in the history of philosophy, creating, with his unique collaborators, a rare marriage between philosophy and cinema" (209). Hence with his cinema books we see two separate fields, philosophy and cinema, ultimately enriching each other.

Though Deleuze does not offer a single overriding philosophy or theory of time that can be easily applied to film analysis, there is much within his philosophical ideas that can be stimulating for an adventurous minded film theorist, historian, or academic. Deleuze, as did Bergson, has a visual writing style that is closer to literature than that of most philosophers. It is this evocative writing style that makes Deleuze a slippery fit for conventional film studies (especially the fairly recent cognitive school of film studies). In the least, Deleuze's imagistic (and sometimes baffling) neologisms, concepts, and terms can be fruitfully used to form textual and interpretative schemata for certain temporal aspects of cinema (sheets of the past, set, crystal-image, any-space-whatevers).

There is a leap of faith in much of Deleuze's writing and theoretical conjectures on this paradigmatic shift from movement-image to time-image. He does not prescribe value to them or say that one cancels the other out. Much of what he says is based in a belief that cinema has in fact changed the way we think and feel about time. This is understandable given the torrent of historical and cultural events that have shaped the 20th century. Deleuze hints at this when he says: "This is the first aspect of the new cinema [time-image]: the break in the sensory-motor link (action-image), and more profoundly in the link between man and the world [my emphasis]..."(*Cinema 2* , 173). Here we sense a post-modern reverberation of failed modernity and the (temporary?) disappearance of Meaning, History, and Destiny. Or, by way of time, a return to Siegfried Kracauer's call for a "redemption of physical reality."

By Donato Totaro , OffScreen, 1999, March 31